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## THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

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27 January 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

: Stanley M. Moskowitz

National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE

SUBJECT

: Monthly Warning Assessment: USSR-EE

#### Implication of the Soviet SA-5 Development. 1.

Analysts were divided on the military significance of the forthcoming SA-5 development, and therefore the liklihood of a pre-emptive Israeli attack. Some believe that the regional military balance will not be seriously affected. They point out that:

this will be the first time that Israeli air is threatened;

the SA-5 targets;	are only	effective	against	slow-moving	high altitude	
						the SA-5 are only effective against slow-moving high altitude targets;

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### 2. Mozambique

Analysts agreed that the anti-Machel forces are gaining strength. CIA analysts believe that Machel will not make it through the year without outside support. The State Department thinks that Machel's position is not that weak.

Machel does not want to call on Cuban troops. He hopes to hold off the NRM by strengthening his own forces and by getting the West to pressure the South Africans to ease-off. In extremis, he will call on the Cubans, and there is some evidence that the Cubans are prepared to come to his aid.

The problem for the Cubans and the Soviets is that the South Africans will almost certainly contest a Cuban presence in southern Mozambique — where Machel needs the help. The South Africans have the military capability to defeat the Cubans. On the other hand, it will be a significant political loss to the Soviets and the Cubans, if a Marxist regime is overturned.

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# Andropov's Emerging Domestic Policy.

- -- departures from Brezhnev's immobilism are becoming very clear;
- -- the campaigns for labor discipline, executive responsibility and public order; with this, new penalties for non-political crimes; no leniency is shown towards dissidents, political or religious (as shown by amnesty decree).
- -- a different personnel policy is taking shape. It favors managerial competence and youthfulness -- prime examples: Central Party Secretary Ryzhkov and new Byelorussian Party Head Slyunkov;
- -- a somewhat more open, public style of leadership is begining: the agenda of each week's Politboro meeting is published;
- -- no sign of imminent "Hungryfication" of the Soviet economy

  -- the decrees on transportation and agriculture are fairly
  routine. Pravda's discussion of economic experiments has
  been cautious.
- -- in general, the emphasis has been on strictness and caution. If there are major economic changes, the most likely area is agriculture. It would take the form of decentralization, turning the collectives into cooperatives and fair price structure.

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Stanley M. Moskowitz

